Following a New Keynesian framework, this paper characterizes welfare in a small open economy and derives the optimal monetary policy rule. It shows that the utility-based loss function for a small open economy is a quadratic expression on domestic in ‡ation, output gap and the real exchange rate. Di¤erent from previous works, this paper demonstrates that a small open economy, completely integrated with the rest of the world, should be concerned about exchange rate variability. Therefore, the optimal policy in a small open economy is not isomorphic to a closed economy and does not prescribe a pure ‡oating exchange rate regime. Domestic in ‡ation targeting is optimal only under a particular parameterization, where the only relevant distortion in the economy is price stickiness. When non e¢ cient steady state output and trade imbalances are present, deviations from inward looking policies arise in the optimal plan.
Introduction
This paper characterizes welfare in a small open economy and constructs an optimal rule for monetary policy. With an analytical expression for a small open economy loss function it is possible to answer various questions regarding policy prescription in individual countries. For example, when is it optimal to adopt in ‡ation targeting? Which type of exchange rate regime should be implemented? When the so called 'fear of ‡oating' is justi…ed, that is, under which economic environment is the variability of exchange rate harmful? How should the central bank react to di¤erent shocks?
Apart from the characterization of the economic dynamics under the optimal policy rule, the derivation of the loss function also allows for a ranking of standard policy rules. That is, we can compare, using our welfare measure, the performance of rules such as producer price in ‡ation target, …xed exchange rate regimes and consumer price in ‡ation target.
Moreover, the speci…cation of a small open economy permits an evaluation of how the degree of openness of a single country a¤ects policy prescription. Additionally, the e¤ect of external shocks on the performance of di¤erent policy rules and the characterization of the optimal response to these disturbances can be assessed.
Following the New Open Economy Macroeconomic literature, the model's structural equations are microfounded and derived from a two country dynamic general equilibrium framework. It features monopolistic competition and price stickiness. Moreover, …nancial markets are completely integrated and the economy is subject to various shocks. Furthermore, the small open economy is derived by making the size of the home economy vanish. Our characterization of a small open economy is consistent with any country that does not in ‡uence world demand (and, therefore, change relative prices relevant for the rest of the world) but has part of its own demand composed of exports.
Welfare is derived using a second order approximation of the utility function and the equilibrium conditions of the model. As a result, the loss function is a quadratic expression on output, in ‡ation and the terms of trade. The weights given to each of these variables'variability are functions of the structural parameters of the model and the target variables vary according with the source of shocks the economy is subject to.
Many authors have addressed the issue of optimal monetary policy and welfare characterization in di¤erent environments. Woodford (2002) In light of these welfare analysis, price stability has been advocated in many works using closed economies models: Woodford (2002), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) , Goodfriend and King (1997) , among others. In open economies, the characterization of optimal policy is more di¢ cult and the question of which exchange rate regime to adopt arises. Gali and Monacelli show that, with a speci…c degree of monopolistic competition and no trade imbalances, the small open economy problem is isomorphic to a closed economy. However several works have questioned the advantage of a pure inward looking monetary policy. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) …rst emphasize that a country might bene…t from in ‡uencing the terms of trade. argue that, with a general speci…cation, individual countries have an incentive to a¤ect the exchange rate and, therefore, there are gains from cooperation in monetary policy. Corsetti a and Pesenti (2002) demonstrate that with incomplete pass through, optimal monetary policy is not purely inward looking. The same was shown by Tille (2003) when there are sector speci…c shocks. This paper presents a simple version of an open economy model where deviation from inward looking policies arises as the optimal rule: the economy's loss function depend on exchange rate variability and optimal policy should respond to external shocks.
The simplicity of the model starts from the characterization of a small economy, which takes world conditions as given However, the model contains basic characteristics of open economies. For example, the economy is can experience trade imbalances given that the speci…cation allow consumers to have coe¢ cient of risk aversion di¤erent than unit and/or imperfect sub-stitutability between goods across borders. Moreover, the model takes into consideration the possibility of a non e¢ -cient level of steady state output. This ine¢ ciency is a result of monopolistic competition in production, which is a crucial assumption used in monetary policy analysis. Therefore it's consequences in policy prescription should not be ignored.
Furthermore, a necessary condition for a rigorous characterization of a small open economy is the presence of home bias. This implies in deviations from purchasing power parity. Additionally, it permits the analysis of real exchange rate and its role in the transmission mechanism of the shocks. The economic factors mentioned above are the basic ingredients of the model, and their welfare consequences are the core of the present work. Besides, the interaction of the economic distortion is explored in the paper.
After formalizing an analytical solution for welfare in the small open economy without imposing a priory assumption in the model's parameter values, the optimal policy is derived. The results obtained are that price stability is optimal only under a speci…c parameterization. This takes place when the only active distortion is price stickiness. In general, the real exchange rate should be optimally managed. In an environment which contains non e¢ cient steady state output and trade imbalances policy prescriptions are altered. The di¤erences are driven by the gap between the marginal utility of consumption and disutility of production present in this economy. Moreover, the presence of home bias in consumption will give an extra role for exchange rate stabilization. In addition, the optimal rule and the performance of standard policy regimes depend on the source shocks hitting the economy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the small open economy dynamics. Section 4 is dedicated to the derivation of welfare. It shows the closed form solution for the loss function and the optimal targeting rule. Section 5 presents the results, analyses what in ‡uences the policy rule prescription and displays a ranking of rules performances. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
The framework consists of a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with complete asset markets. Deviations from purchasing power arise from the existence of a home bias in consumption. The size of the home bias is given by the degree of openness of the economy. Moreover the demand for a country's good is proportional to its size. This speci…cation allows us to characterize the small open economy. This is done by taking the limit of the home size to zero. The two countries Home and Foreign represent the small open economy and the rest of the world.
Monopolistic competition and sticky prices are introduced in the small open economy in order to address issues of monetary policy. We assume that home price setting follows a Calvo-type contract. This speci…cation has richer dynamic e¤ects on monetary policy than when prices are set one period in advance.
Preferences
The world economy consists of two countries, H (Home -the small economy) and F (Foreign -the rest of the world). The world economy is populated with a continuum of agents, where the population in the segment [0; n) belong to country H and the population in the segment (n; 1] belong to country F: The utility function of the representative consumer j in country H is given by:
Households obtain utility from consumption (C j ) and disutility from production of all the goods (y j ) 1 . Productivity shocks are denoted by " Y;s . There is no cash in the economy and the central bank controls the nominal risk free interest rate 2 .
1 This speci…cation would be equivalent to one in whith …rms are modeled separately.
These …rms employ workers who derive disutility from work. The e¤ort disutility is separable from the consumption utility. 2 See Woodford (2003-chapter 2) for a discussion about specifying a cashless economy.
We will assume the following functional forms in order to clarify the algebra:
Where is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and is elasticity of goods production.
The home bias is speci…ed as in , where this bias is a function of the relative size of the two economies (n) and of the degree of openness ( ). The proportion of foreign-produced goods in home consumption is proportional to Foreign size, that is, 1 v = (1 n) : And the proportion of home-produced goods in foreign consumption is v = n . Thus, the consumption indexes in country H and F have the following form:
Where Foreign consumption variables are denoted with a star. The elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods is and C H (C H ) and C F (C F ) are Home (Foreign) consumption of the di¤erentiated products produced in countries H and F . These are de…ned by the following utility indexes.
The elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated products is : With the above speci…cation we can derive how consumers choose between Home and Foreign goods, and between the di¤erentiated products within each economy:
Moreover, given the above speci…cation, the consumption price index P (based on the index C), P H and P F (based on the sub-indexes C H and C F ) can then be expressed as follows:
Analogous expressions of (4), (5), (6) and (7) hold for the Foreign economy.
Therefore, the individual …rms'demand for Home and Foreign di¤eren-tiated products, h and f, are:
To obtain Home (Foreign) overall demand, we need to aggregate across Home consumers (of measure n) and Foreign consumers (of measure (1 n)) of Home (Foreign) goods. In addition, to characterize of the small open economy, we use our de…nition of v and v ; and take the limit n ! 0: As a result, demand for the small economy and the rest of the world products are the following:
From equations (10) and (11) we can see that external changes in consumption will a¤ect our small open economy, but the reverse is not true.
Moreover, movements in the real exchange rate will not modify the rest of the world's demand.
Home (Foreign) public consumption G t (G t ) are treated as …scal shock. The government in country H (F ) only consumes Home (Foreign) goods and its preferences regarding the di¤erentiated products are analogous to Home (Foreign) consumer's preferences. Public consumption is …nanced by taxes and/or transfers. The government's budget constraint at Home can be written as follows (an analogous speci…cation is valid for the Foreign country):
Complete Asset Markets Structure:
By assuming a complete markets structure, all household have access to state contingent claims that deliver a unit of Home (Foreign) currency in each state of the world. In this setting there is perfect risk sharing and the value of the ratio of marginal intertemporal substitution is equated across countries.
Under this speci…cation, the evolution of the current account does not in ‡uence the rest of the macroeconomic dynamics. Moreover, we can characterize the equilibrium without writing down Home and Foreign Euler equations.
Price-setting Mechanism
Firms produce di¤erentiated products and know the form of their individual demand functions (given by equations 8 and 9). When these …rms maximize their pro…ts, they take the overall market prices and product, P t ; P t ; Y t and Y t ; as given. We assume that Home price setting follows a Calvo-type contract where each …rm has a …xed probability of setting a new price (1 ).
Hence, the optimal choice of …rms that can set their pricep t (h) at time t is:
Therefore, given that a fraction of the population cannot adjust their prices in each period, we have:
In steady state, as show in appendix A, we have:
Where is de…ned as (1 H )( 1) ; therefore a higher ; speci…es a greater marginal utility for each level of home production in steady state.
Firms in the rest of the world, F , can adjust their prices freely. The Foreign ( ‡exible) pricing equation is therefore:
However, relaxing the assumption of price ‡exibility in the rest of the world will not a¤ect the way in which foreign consumption a¤ects the small open economy. This will only modify how external shocks a¤ect external consumption.
The Equilibrium dynamics of the Small Open Economy:
In this section we will loglinerize around the steady state the equilibrium conditions of the small open economy dynamics. The steady state characteristics are shown in appendix A.
With variables with a hat denoting log deviation from the steady state, the system of equilibrium conditions in the small open economy will be expressed by the following four equations: , allowing for the analysis of this shock even when the zero steady state government consumption is zero 3 . Moreover, H t denotes the producer price in ‡ation.
Finally the exogenous foreign dynamics, characterized by the ‡exible price allocation, can be summarized by the following equation:
Foreign consumption is a linear combination of disturbances, and will be treated as an 'external shock' 4 . Therefore, taking the domestic system of equations, the foreign consumption, and the policy rule, we can determine the equilibrium dynamics of b
The log linear identities presented above are su¢ cient to describe the dynamics of these variables, which are crucial in our welfare derivation. To retrieve the values for Home interest rate and nominal exchange rate, we just need to use Home Euler equation and the real exchange rate evolution identity:
Welfare
Welfare is derived in appendix B using a second order approximation of the utility function. This approximation gives rise to an expression which contains means, variances and covariances of b Y t ; c RS t ; and b H t : Therefore a second order approximation of the equilibrium conditions is used to eliminate the means and covariances terms. As a result, the loss function is a quadratic expression on b Y t ; c RS t ; and b H t and takes the following form: The policy maker's problem is to minimize (14) subject to the Phillips Curve and the relationship between output and the terms of trade, derived from the demand equation and the risk sharing condition:
where l = ( 1) (2 ) and u t and v t are linear combinations of the shocks, as de…ned in the appendix.
We characterize the solution for the case in which the monetary authority can commit to a policy rule 5 . The …rst order conditions from the minimization problem are:
Combining the last three equation, we obtain the following targeting rule 6 :
21) Where denotes …rst di¤erence of the variable. The above expression is the optimal policy rule that the small open economy should adopt. In the general speci…cation, the optimal targeting rule prescribes not only stabilizing in ‡ation and output but also managing real exchange rate movements. Moreover, even if we express welfare as a function of CPI in ‡ation instead of producer price in ‡ation b H t , we will still have an extra exchange rate variability term in the loss function, and therefore in the targeting rule.
Results

By inspection of the weights
; Y ; and RS we can see the determinants of welfare losses in the small open economy. Apart from price stickiness, this economy is characterized by a gap between marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of production, introduced by monopolistic competition. This factor will give rise to di¤erent incentives to the policy marker 7 .
As in the closed economy literature, the existence of market power brings in an in ‡ationary biased policy. That is, it can be optimal to have a higher in ‡ation rate in order to increase the suboptimal level of output. In an open economy, as noted by Corseti and Pesenti (2001), the presence of imperfect substitution in consumption of home and foreign goods confers a role to monetary policy in in ‡uencing the exchange rate. An example of that is when an appreciation can lead to a decrease in demand for home goods, decreasing home output and consumption. If the marginal fall in the disutility of 6 See Svensson (2003) for a discussion on the design of 'general targeting rules'. 7 In our welfare approximation, this is represented by
production is bigger than the one in utility of consumption, this monetary policy intervention (a contractionary one, leading to the appreciation of the exchange rate) is welfare improving. In a close economy, that here is fully characterized by = 0, this trade o¤ introduced by market power, can be eliminated by subsidizing production. That is, is set such that = 1. In an open economy, apart from setting setting an optimal subsidy, preferences need to be de…ned such that Home and Foreign goods are perfect substitutes and there are no trade imbalances. Analytically this can be done by specifying to attain = (1 ) 1 and preferences with = = 1: Therefore, if the factors above are eliminated, the only distortion is the one generate by price stickiness in home price setting. Hence, in the absence of mark up shocks, the zero in ‡ation equilibrium is the e¢ cient one. The reason why pure cost-push shocks destroy the optimality of price stability is that they directly change the policy trade o¤ between in ‡ation and output 8 .
To summarize, the assumptions needed in order to have Producer Price Stability as the optimal plan in a Small Open Economy (Special Case 1) are:
2. No mark-up shocks.
= = 1
In this case, the optimal weight on the loss function are:
And the target for output is:
The relative wights are analogous to the closed economy case and the policy should not respond to external shocks.
There is another case where producer price stability coincides with optimal policy. This happens when, even with assumption 1 relaxed, there are only foreign shocks. In this case where the open economy does not su¤er from trade imbalances, foreign shocks do not a¤ect the target variables even when there are no optimal subsidy policy A new economic characteristic that can be explored in this framework is the violation of purchasing power parity. Its implication are di¤erences in marginal utility of consumption across borders. To analyze how this change the policy trade o¤, we maintain assumptions 1 and 2 and impose a less restrictive assumption on the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticity:
Under these assumptions, in an environment without home bias (and therefore, where PPP holds) show that individual countries have no incentives to in ‡uence the terms of trade. However, with the present speci…cation, assumptions 1, 2 and 3'imply a loss function with the same expressions (22) and (24) as the weights for in ‡ation and output variability as in the case above, but there is a non zero weight on the variability of the real exchange rate. This is shown in the appendix, and referred as "Special Case 2".
The assumption that = 1 implies that consumption of Home and Foreign goods are proportional across borders and this relationship is independent from exchange rate behavior. However, di¤erences in aggregate consumption at Home relative to the rest of the world may arise from movements in the real exchange rate. It is interesting to analyze this speci…cation because it is the closest to Special Case 1 where deviations from inward looking policy arise as the optimal one. Therefore, it shows that the simple di¤erence in preferences characteristics give rise to a role for exchange rate management.
We now turn to the general case, where we can fully explore the monopolistic distortions in a Small Open Economy. The relevant weights on the variances of each variables are the general ones shown in the appendix. Our approach is to take a benchmark calibration for [ ; ; ; ; ] and evaluate how the loss function's weights depend on the parameters in the neighborhood of this calibration. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ; is normally assumed to be between 1 and 5, and we assume that it is unitary. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) we assume = 0:47. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, , is assumed to be 3 (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) argue that it should be between 3 and 6). Finally we start with a the 'optimal subsidy'policy, with = 1=(1 ), where is set as 0:4; implying a 40% import share of the GDP.
If we reduce , the steady state mark up parameter, the weights given to output and the real exchange rate increase and the weights given to in‡ation variability falls. This is because a lower imply a higher disutility of production relative to the marginal utility of consumption, and hence a lower steady state output level. Therefore, optimal policy will tend to have an in ‡ationary bias. On the other hand, with a su¢ ciently high ; policy makers have an incentive to use an exchange rate appreciation in order to reduce production. This will be done whenever the a welfare gain from marginal fall in the disutility of production is bigger than the one in utility of consumption In this cases, optimal policy prescribe a more ‡exible exchange rate and, therefore, the loss function have a lower weight for its variability.
A lower intratemporal elasticity of substitution, , reduces the weight given to exchange rate and output variability. And the weight on in ‡ation variance is increases. The incentive for monetary policy to use exchange rate in order to narrow down the monopolistic competition distortion is higher (similarly to the case of a higher ). Additionally, a greater elasticity of goods production will increase the weight given to the domestic variables variance, output and in ‡ation, and reduce the one give to the real exchange rate variability. Figure 1 shows how optimal monetary policy responds to a positive foreign shock. We note that, when > 1; (which together with = 1 implies that Home and Foreign goods are substitutes in the utility), and < 1=(1 ); there is an in ‡ationary bias. This is driven by the marginal welfare gain of increasing the ine¢ ciently low level of output. On the other hand when < 1 and > 1=(1 ); reducing the disutility of production outweighs the bene…t of increasing utility of consumption. Therefore, in the later case, real exchange rate depreciation is higher (and the weight on its variability is optimally lower).
One feature of the present representation of a small open economy is the ability to evaluate how the level of openness a¤ects the economy's dynamics and the policy prescription. A more open economy, with a higher proportion of GDP composed of imports, will always have a bigger loss associated with exchange rate variability. When increase, if we maintain the trade o¤ between in ‡ation and output unchanged (by changing accordingly), the domestic variables will have a smaller weight in the small open economy loss function relative to the exchange rate.
These comparative statics allow us to judge the appropriateness of standard policy rules, such as domestic in ‡ation target or exchange rate peg as a function of the economy characteristics. However, the source of the shock hitting the economy is a sole determinant of the performance of policy rules. And the composition of the target variables b Y T t and c RS T t stipulates how optimal policy should respond to di¤erent shock.
The performance of a producer price index in ‡ation target (or domestic in ‡ation target), consumer price index in ‡ation target and …xed exchange rate regime is shown in table 1. It presents the values, according to our welfare measure, of the economic losses caused by the di¤erent disturbances, when each policy rules is used. The numbers are in percentage of the value of the loss function under the optimal policy response. However, given the ordinal characteristic of the utility function, these numbers should be consider with caution. For this reason, we present the ranking of the policy performance for each type of shock. Table 1 For this exercise we keep the values for [ ; ; ; ; ] as previously speci…ed. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods is assumed to be 10 as in . To characterize an average length of price contract of 3 quarters, we assume = 0:66: Finally, we assume = 0:99:
Regarding the domestic shocks, domestic in ‡ation targeting seems to have a relatively better performance when there is a shock on demand, which is the case of g t : When there is a mark up disturbance or a productivity shock, …xing the exchange rate delivers a higher welfare relative to the other policies. If the economy main source of shocks comes from abroad, the best performing rule would be a CPI in ‡ation target. However, this is a particular speci…ca-tion, and as previously shown, changes in the economies characteristics (and therefore, in structural parameters) will in ‡uence the above ranking.
Conclusion
This paper formalizes an analytical solution for welfare in a small open economy and derives the optimal targeting rule. It allows for the analysis of welfare consequences of di¤erent shocks and of the performance of usual monetary policy rules. This is done accordingly to the economic environment, and, therefore, the structural parametrization of the model.
Deviations from inward looking policies arises in the optimal targeting rule. Price stability is optimal only under a speci…c parameterization, where the only relevant distortion in the economy is price stickiness. Allowing for a non e¢ cient steady state output and trade imbalances imply di¤erent policy prescriptions. These di¤erences are driven by the gap between the marginal utility of consumption and disutility of production present in this economy. In general the real exchange rate is part of the policy target and optimal policy should respond to external shocks.
In general, monetary policy should respond to external shocks. Moreover, the source of the shocks hitting the economy it's a sole determinant of the performance of inward looking policies relative to exchange rate management.
With the tools used to derive welfare and the optimal policy, many other economic characteristics can be analyzed within an small open economy framework. The presence of market incompleteness and the use of other policy instruments are some examples.
